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COMMENTS
Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End
Mutual Funds
I.

INTRODUCTION

The mutual fund industry is regulated largely through the Investment Company Act of 1940,1 enacted to provide broad relief
against such widespread abuses as inadequate capital structures, fraud
on investors, theft from fund treasuries, and insider dealings in loan
and security transactions, which were prevalent in the industry
during the 1920's and 1930's.2 It is generally conceded that the Act
abated most of these abuses, which had threatened the existence of
the industry.8 This was accomplished primarily by requiring registration of investment companies4 and disclosure of financing and investment policies,5 by regulating the custody of assets6 and the issuance of
debt securities,7 by requiring adequate reserves for redemption of
investment securities,8 and by prohibiting transactions in loans and
securities between the funds and their officers, directors, and affiliates.9
As a whole the mutual fund industry has prospered under the
Act. A comprehensive report recently published by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10 indicates that the net assets held
by registered open-end mutual funds 11 as of June 30, 1969, were
54.7 billion dollars,12 a great increase from the less than one-half
1. Ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ SOa-1 to -52 (1970),
2. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6·11 (1940). See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd., 294 F,2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
3. SECURITIES &: ExCHANGE COMMISSION, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1966) [hereinafter
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS]. See also S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969),
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80a•8 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ SOa-13, -29 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (1970).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1970).
8. 15 U.S.C. § SOa-22 (1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ SOa-17, -21 (1970),
10. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, vol. 2, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS REPoRT].
11. An open-end mutual fund offers to sell new shares on a continuing basis and
stands ready to redeem any outstanding shares. 15 U.S.C. § SOa-5 (1970), It is to be
distinguished from a closed-end fund, which after initial capitalization does not engage
in the continuous sale of securities or redeem outstanding securities. As of December 31,
1970, the net assets of closed-end funds amounted to $2,825,620,000, far less than their
open-end counterparts. MOODY'S BANK &: FINANCE MANUAL, appendix (1971),
12. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 10, at 150. Net assets have slipped
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billion dollars in 1940.18 As of December 31, 1970, open-end shares
were held in over 11 million accounts as opposed to 296,000 accounts
in 1940;14 the average number of shareholders per fund is now
3,169.15 These statistics are some indication of the confidence that
the public has placed in mutual funds as a mode of investment.
Although the curtailment of self-dealing and other abuses has
certainly contributed to the success and prosperity that mutual funds
today enjoy, recent cases indicate that significant problems remain.
Perhaps the most critical problem is the relationship of the investment adviser to the fund. As the incidents of adviser misconduct
have become more prominent16 and the litigation directed against
them more frequent, 17 interest in revitalizing the position of the
independent director as guardian for the fund has quickened.18
This Comment will analyze the role of independent directors in
open-end mutual funds. It will consider the potential impact of
recent decisions and statutory amendments and explore the possibilities of a more significant role for such directors. The discussion will
focus on the following aspects of the directors' role: (1) the duty
to review contractual arrangements between the fund and the
external adviser; (2) the duty to serve as a "watchdog"19 over fund
policy, brokerage allocation on portfolio transactions, and miscellaneous fund operations; and (3) the responsibilities upon the sale or
merger of the investment adviser. In order to appreciate the role
intended for the independent director by Congress and the role he
has actually come to play, the nature of the mutual fund industry
must first be briefly reviewed.
somewhat to 53.3 billion dollars, as of September 30, 1971. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1971, at 3,
col. I.

13. MOODY'S BANK &: FINANCE MANUAL, appendix (1971).
14. Id.
15. INSTlTUTIONAL INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 10, at 168.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~in~~~

found it a breach of fiduciary duty for the adviser to transfer its management function
at a profit. Industry analysts estimate that if Rosenfeld is followed, the potential liability of transferring advisers to their former funds could approach 100 million dollars. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
17. In Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971), the
court found an adviser and the affiliated directors of a mutual fund liable for failing
to inform the independent directors of the possibility of recapturing brokerage commission give-ups on certain local stock exchanges. It has been estimated that there are
over fifty cases pending that involve issues similar to those in Moses. Wall St. J., June 7,
1971, at 5, col. I.
18. The original provision for independent directors was introduced in the Investment Company Act of 1940. In 1970 the Act was amended to strengthen that provision,
Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified in ch. 2D, subch. I, 15
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1970 Amendments].
19. The use of this term in the director context is apparently attributable to the
noted mutual fund authority Abraham I. Pomerantz. See Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 739 (1967) (remarks of A. Pomerantz) [hereinafter Conference].
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THE OPEN-END MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY20

Like that of any other corporation, the capital of a mutual fund
consists largely of shareholder contributions. Unlike other corporations, virtually all the assets are in the form of securities purchased
with these contributions. Yet the most distinctive feature of the openend mutual fund industry is the externalization of management.21
This external adviser is an independent entity that provides a full
range of clerical services in addition to managing the assets of the
fund. As direct compensation for performing such services the adviser
receives as a fee either a set percentage or a "sliding scale" percentage
of the fund's net assets.22 The adviser may also receive indirect
compensation in several ways. Most advisers have an underwriter
affiliate that will initially offer the shares of the fund to the public
or to a captive sales force or at least to designated brokers who will
seek new customers for the fund. 28 Some advisers have a brokeraffiliate, or the adviser itself may be a broker, which means it may
keep commissions on portfolio transactions within the advisory
complex.24 Furthermore, many advisers manage several funds, the socalled "fund complexes," which give rise to peculiar conflict-ofinterest problems.25 The ultimate compensation for any adviser
comes with the successful sale of the entire advisory structure, usually
at a very handsome profit.
The anomaly of the duty-compensation arrangement between
the fund and the adviser is apparent-while the duty of the adviser
can be characterized as investing and managing the combined funds
of many investors so as to maximize the return on these funds, the
compensation structure places a high priority on fund activity and
raw size. These two interests are frequently inconsistent.
Within an industry so structured, the issue is whether there is
any practical way to safeguard the rights of the investor. Perhaps the
most obvious answer is that the shareholder who is dissatisfied with
the adviser's performance is free to redeem his shares. However, this
solution may not be as simple as it sounds. The shareholder in a
20. Much of the descriptive data that follows is based upon PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICA•
TIONS, supra note 4, at 33-77.
21. PUBLIC Poucy IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 45. Internally managed funds arc
uncommon in the industry, although the large closed-end funds are so managed. Id. at
49-50 & n.107.
22. Approximately 73% of fund advisers are compensated on the basis of a percentage of assets. The majority of these advisers charge an average fee of between ,4%
and ,6% of net assets on an annual basis. The average advisory fee is .45%, INsnTUTIONAL !NvESI"ORS REPORT, supra note 10, at 216-18. See also PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICA•
TIONS, supra note 4, at 46.
23. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 9.
24. In a sample of fund advisers, 59% indicated affiliation with a broker-dealer.
lNSTn'UTIONAL !NvEsroRS REPORT, supra note 10, at 162.
25. See text accompanying notes 148-49 infra.
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normal corporation will incur a sales commission upon selling his
interest in one corporation and a similar commission upon investing his funds in another corporation. The fund shareholder may
be more inclined to retain his present fund holdings because, upon
the purchase of his shares, a sales load of 7½ to 9%26 was deducted
from his investment, an amount significantly higher than the normal
brokerage commission.27 Therefore, even assuming there is no
redemption fee, an investor will be wary of redeeming shares and
incurring another sales load to purchase shares of another fund.
Recognizing these problems, Congress sought to provide more
tangible safeguards for the fund's investors by enactment of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. As an initial matter, section 15 of
that Act requires that the original advisory contract be approved by
holders of a majority of the outstanding voting securities.28 Since
it is the adviser who typically creates the fund as an adjunct to its
own business, and since it controls the initial voting securities, such
approval has proved to be perfunctory.29 Renewals of the contract
may be submitted to the shareholders, but this is not required by the
Act.80 Thus, the shareholders may never have an effective chance to
challenge the management contract; further, as is the case with most
large corporations, the incumbents' control of the proxy machinery
will serve to squash serious challenges to management's prerogatives.81 Finally, it is likely that despite full disclosure to the shareholders, many may fail to understand the terms of the management
contract. Recently, at an annual meeting of one fund a mere 14.56%
of the shares were voted in favor of a proposal to require the fund's
directors to justify the merits of the external management fee arrangement with the adviser.82 And this may be the highest favorable
vote any shareholder proposal has ever received in the industryl 88
Given the control exercised by the external adviser, the use of
affiliated underwriters and brokers, and the conflicts of interest inherent in mutual fund complexes, it is understandable why it has
been said that "nothing-but nothing-approaches the open-end
mutual fund for incestuous relationships."84 To counter such undue
influence, section 1035 of the Investment Company Act provides an
26. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 204-05.
27. See N.Y.S.E. Constitution, art. XV,§§ I, 8, IO & Rule 369 (1970), 2 CCH N.Y.S.E.
GUIDE, 1111 1701, 1708, 1710, 2369 (1970).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) {1970).
29. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 74-75, 128-30.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (1970).
31. See, e.g., w. CARY, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CORl'ORATIONS 229-34 (4th ed. 1969).
32. See N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 31, col. I.
33. Id.
34. Conference, supra note 19, at 739 (remarks of A. Pomerantz).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970).
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additional internal check on the external management. This section
requires that the fund's board of directors contain a specified number
of directors who are not directly or indirectly affiliated with the adviser. A majority of the board must consist of such "independent"
directors if the adviser is directly or indirectly affiliated with a
broker, undenvriter, or investment banker; othenvise, at least 40%
of the board must be independent.36
The Act provides few specific duties for these special directors.
A majority of them must approve the renewal of the advisory contract37 and the appointment of the fund's certified public accountants.38 But more important, Congress hoped to provide a check on
the adviser and to represent the interest of the fund shareholders
by making the independent directors the "watchdogs" over the fund's
operations.39 This was accomplished by giving both the SEC40 and
shareholders41 a cause of action under section 36 to remedy a violation
of the fiduciary duty of assuring that the fund is operated solely for
the benefit of the shareholders.42 The fiduciary obligations of the
independent directors, however, would exist absent the Investment
Company Act. Because the shareholder entrusts his money to the
fund there is an inherent duty in the directors to assure to the fullest
extent of their abilities that the fund is managed in the best interests
of the shareholders.43 Thus, the independent directors are subject
to traditional standards of directorial responsibility imposed by
36. In most cases the adviser is affiliated with an underwriter or broker so the majority of the board must be "independent." PUBLIC POLICY IMl'LICATIONS, supra note 4,
at 162.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31 (1970).
39. S. REF. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1969).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970). Prior to the 1970 amendments, the SEC was
empowered to seek injunctive relief only if the conduct of the independent directors
amounted to "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust." Ch. 686, tit. I, § 36, 54 Stat.
841. The statute now speaks of "a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal mis•
conduct." The legislative history indicates that the revised language was intended to
end the reluctance of some courts to find a breach of fiduciary duty because of the
"punitive overtones" associated with "gross misconduct." S. REF. No. 184, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 36 (1969). It is also clear that the "personal misconduct" language is not a
lesser standard of fiduciary duty than under the former section or under common-law
principles. H.R. REF. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970). See generally Comment,
Private Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Advisers: Amended Section !J6 of the
1910 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 154-63 (1971).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970). Prior to the 1970 amendments, there was no
express cause of action for the shareholders. The weight of authority, however, found
such a right implied from § 36 of the Act. See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 869 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2) (1970). See Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260
(1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). Cf. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207,
218-19 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
43. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSIS § 2 &: comment b (1959).
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common law and state statute.44 Section 36 was not intended to
pre-empt traditional remedies, but rather to provide new remedies
for injurious conduct by the directors.45 Indeed, most cases charging
the independent directors with a breach of their fiduciary duty are
brought jointly under the Investment Company Act and common-law
principles.46
Unfortunately, the independent director safeguard proved to be
a disappointment.47 He was often found not to be independent in
fact, in some measure because of the inadequacies of the 1940 Act. 48
"Unaffiliated" did not mean "unrelated" for the purposes of the
Act. Hence, independent directors were permitted to own up to ,
4,9% of the outstanding stock of the external adviser; 49 likewise,
directors were deemed to be independent despite substantial business
relationships with the fund or external adviser, or despite a close
relationship by blood, marriage, or friendship with the management.60 In addition, some courts strained to find a director independent, although by the nature of his contacts with the fund and
adviser his independence was doubtful. 61
Even when the independent director was not financially interested
he was frequently morally bound to the adviser. The adviser's
domination permitted it to nominate whom it wished, and its control of the proxy machinery assured the nominees' election. It has
been noted that "the men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs
to watch them." 62 The adviser will not choose a director who is likely
to be hard on it, or for that matter, take the job seriously. As one
observer has noted, "[the independent director] only has some power.
He is probably reluctant to exercise that in a vigorous way, because
44. See generally W. CARY, supra note 31, at 513-49; M. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILmES
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 13-23 (1961); Eisenberg &: Lehr, An Aspect of the

Emerging "Federal Carporation Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 20 RurcERS L. REv. 181 (1966); Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund
Complexes, 119 U. PA. L REv. 205, 211-12 (1970).
45. See McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 148 N.W.2d 804 (1967).
46. See text accompanying notes 75-99 infra.
47. Compare Eisenberg&: Lehr, supra note 44, and Mundheim, Some Thoughts on
the Duties and R'esponsibilities of Unaffiliated Director of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 1058 (1967), with Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual
Funds, 29 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 777 (1964), and Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities
in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258 (1961).
48. See PUBLIC POLICY lMI'LICATIONS, supra note 4, at 12, 74; WHARTON SCHOOL OF
FINANCE &: COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FuNDs, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1962) [hereinafter WHARTON REPORT].
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1970).
50. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 67-68.
51. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 535-36, 542-43 (D. Colo. 1963). See also
Coran v. Thorpe, 42 Del. Ch. 67, 70-73, 203 A.2d 620, 622-23 (1964).
52. Conference, supra note 19, at 739 (remarks of A. Pomerantz).
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it's unpleasant to [countermand] people that he has worked with for
years and likes and respects, and probably that's the only reason that
he is on the board."53 Even assuming their independence, the directors may receive information from the adviser that is not impartial.
Moreover, those upon whom the directors may seek to rely for counsel
may not be the best sources. For example, it is common practice for
advisers and funds to retain the same attorney and certified public
accountants. 54
In response to studies of the industry,55 Congress concluded that
the statutory definition of independent directors did not ensure an
independent check on management and provide an adequate means
for the representation of shareholder interests in fund affairs.rm Thus,
the Act was amended in 1970 to speak of "interested persons" in order
to exclude those having close family ties or substantial financial or
professional relationships with advisers, underwriters, officers, and
those persons who have beneficial or legal interests as fiduciaries in
securities issued by the adviser or undenvriter and their controlling
persons.57
Even if a fully independent director is chosen as a result of the
amendments, the special nature of a mutual fund suggests that the
fund director must assume a different role from that of the director
of the ordinary industrial corporation. The fund director seldom has
effective control over the individual investment decisions, other than
to ensure that the external management is adhering to broad fund
objectives58 and performing reasonably well. Even if an objective
should prove unprofitable, he has no power to invoke a new objective,
in contrast to the power of regular corporate directors to seek profits
for the shareholders by switching to different products or strategies.no
The functions of the independent directors should nonetheless be
subjected to close scrutiny by the courts because of the highly liquid
nature of the fund's assets. The Institutional Investors Study concludes: "As with all corporations ... the ultimate responsibility for
the investment company's activities lies with its Board of Directors."00
53. Id. at 759 (remarks of P. Loomis).
54. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 74.
55. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4: WHARTON REPORT, supra note 48.
56. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1969).
!57. 1970 Amendments, supra note 18, § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970),
58. Under § 8 of the Act, each mutual fund is required to set forth in its charter
and registration statement its policy objectives with respect to concentration of investments in particular industries as well as its fundamental policy concerning profits in
the form of ordinary income, capital gain, or a combination thereof. 15 U.S.C. § S0a-8
(1970). The adviser is bound by these policies when executing fund transactions, but
effective review of the adviser's adherence to such policies is difficult. See PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 4546.
59. See generally H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 207 (1970).
60. INSTITOTIONAL INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 10, at 167.
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The problem is thus one of defining clear duties and standards and
providing effective remedies that will protect the investing public.
III.

DUTIES OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR

A. The Investment Advisory Contract
As previously indicated, the compensation the adviser receives is
typically a fixed annual percentage of the fund's average daily assets,
usually one half of one per cent. 61 The trend, however, is to a
sliding scale rate, which decreases as the assets held by the fund
increase.62 In either case the absolute fee increases as the assets of
the fund increase through the sale of additional fund shares or
through an increase in the market value of the portfolio. However,
the economies of scale that result only rarely accrue to the fund
through reduced fees or better services.63
In light of the dominance of the adviser over both the negotiating
process and the day-to-day operations of the fund, there are several
alternatives that would theoretically provide some measure of control in the contracting and compensation process. One alternative
would be to impose direct restrictions on the adviser. This could
be accomplished by setting an industry-wide maximum fee schedule
imposed either by statute or through a regulatory body.64 An alternative would be to impose a fiduciary duty upon the adviser and thus
expose it to the threat of damages if a breach of trust were found.
This is the course that Congress has recently taken. Although a
broad fiduciary duty had been implied from the Act, 65 Congress
in 1970 imposed an explicit fiduciary duty on the adviser with respect
to the contractual compensation it receives. 66 This provision replaced
a proposal calling for a "reasonable" fee that was passed in the Senate
but later died in the House.67 The legislative history indicates that
comparison of the fee with "best industry practice" and a determination whether the fee reflects economies of scale will be influential in
establishing a breach of duty. 68 The precise contours of the test will
61. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
62. See PtraLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 97-100.
63. !NSTITtJTIONAL INVESTORS SnmY, supra note 10, at 214.
64. The SEC already possesses broad powers under the Act in other areas. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-37 to -39 (1970) (rule-making power); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970) (power
to seek injunctive or other relief to remedy or prevent a breach of fiduciary duty).
65. See note 41 supra.
66. 1970 Amendments, supra note 18, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
67. See S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1969).
68. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969).
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be etched out only after the amendment becomes effective in June
1972.69 It may be pointed out, however, that the imposition on a
business entity of a largely undefined fiduciary duty that effectively
compels that entity to agree to contractual terms which fail to
maximize its profits is hazardous at best.
Another approach to the problems would be to delegate the
responsibility for the contractual process to someone who clearly
represents the fund rather than the adviser. Congress tried to implement such a policy in the 1940 Act by requiring approval of contracts
and renewals by the shareholders or the independent directors, 70 and
giving the directors special termination rights over the contract.71
However, because of the adviser's power and the emasculation of
shareholder control, the usual contract was not the result of an
arms-length bargaining transaction. 72 With the extraordinary growth
of the industry in the 1950's and 1960's, the fees accruing to many
advisers were enormous, and a number of shareholder derivative
suits were brought alleging "excessive" or "unfair" fees. 78 Yet the
courts generally applied the common-law "corporate waste" standard,
which served to protect the director if the management fee approximated the industry average and full disclosure of the fee had been
made to the shareholders.74 This test effectively precluded a finding
that fees were excessive because the lack of price competition in the
industry rendered the standard for comparison meaningless.
A case in point is Meiselman v. Eberstadt.75 The plaintiff claimed
that the affiliated directors of a fund, who were also shareholders in
the external management company, had paid themselves excessive
compensation through the management company, as measured by a
common-law reasonableness standard, and that the independent
directors had acquiesced in the illegal fee arrangement. The advisory
contract provided for a sliding fee arrangement. The court dismissed
the complaint against the independent directors, finding "no possibility of liability of their part."76 Ultimately, the court dismissed the
entire complaint, finding that the compensation was not "legally excessive."77 The court seemed to be influenced by the facts that the
69. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b) (1970) becomes effective June 14, 1972. 1970 Amendments,
supra note 18, § 30.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970).
71. The advisory contract may be terminated for any reason by the directors upon
sh::ty days notice. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(3) (1970). There does not appear to be a case
reported in which such a termination has occurred.
72. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 131.
73. Beaveen 1959 and 1966, over fifty suits were instituted involving advisory fees.
Id. at 132, 154.
74. See id. at 133-43.
75. 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
76. 39 Del. Ch. at 564, 170 A.2d at 721.
77. 39 Del. Ch. at 568, 170 A.2d at 723.
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independent directors, who were not proved to be under the control
of the other defendants, had approved the management contract annually, that the shareholders had twice approved the arrangement,
and that the fees were lower than the industry average. Recognizing
that fiduciaries may not legally receive excessive compensation, the
court, in dictum, did caution the nonaffiliated directors to the "responsibility to make appropriate reviews of the reasonableness of the
arrangement from every point of view." 78
In the leading case of Saxe v. Brady,79 the plaintiff sued the adviser and the independent directors, under both common-law principles and the Investment Company Act, charging that a flat fee of one
half of one per cent of average daily net assets was unreasonably excessive and constituted corporate waste. The plaintiff alleged, inter
alia, a breach of fiduciary duty by the independent directors in
passively renewing the management contract and in allowing themselves to be dominated by the adviser. As in Meiselman, the court
recognized that the independent directors had an obligation to guard
the fund against the type of abuses alleged. However, it did not reach
the issue under section 15 of the Act80 of director liability in continuing to approve the advisory contract, because it first considered
whether the fee arrangement was a waste of corporate assets. Framing
the issue as whether the services received by the fund were so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would deem them worth what the fund had paid, 81 the court
found the fee arrangement to be reasonable and dismissed the complaint. The court stated that the average fee for the industry was entitled to "very weighty consideration," especially when the fund
shareholders had overwhelmingly ratified previous payments and like
future fees. 82 The court did indicate, however, that the fee could
be held unreasonable when the net profits of the adviser became
unconscionable or "shocking."83
The court also cautioned that an independent board could not
wait until the size of the management fee warranted a finding of
waste before attempting to negotiate a more favorable contract with
the adviser, and that in this case the fees were approaching a point
of unreasonableness.84 Two tests were suggested for the board to
consider: Comparing the adviser's net profits with those of other
advisers, and comparing the adviser's ratio of expenses to fees with
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

39 Del. Ch. at 568, 170 A.2d at 723.
40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (196~).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 {1970).
40 Del. Ch. at 486, 184 A.2d at 610.
40 Del. Ch. at 488, 184 A.2d at 611.
40 Del. Ch. at 496, 184 A.2d at 615.
40 Del. Ch. at 498, 184 A.2d at 616.
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those of similar advisers.85 Comparison of the latter statistics between
large and small advisory firms would be a great help in uncovering
economies of scale that are not being reflected in the fees. 80 It is
doubtful whether such statistics could be easily obtained by the
independent directors. If advisers were periodically required to
report such data to the SEC for public dissemination, the directors'
task would, however, be greatly facilitated. The SEC apparently has
the power to command such reports under section 204 of the Investment Advisers Act. 87 In any event, Saxe implies an obligation to seek
adjustment of the management fee to reflect a diminution in the
adviser's expenses resulting from economies of scale.
In Meiselman and Saxe the courts recognized the independent
directors' duty to control the fees of the adviser, but were reluctant to
consider possible liability for failure to exert control. The court cannot be faulted for dismissing the complaint against the independent
directors in Meiselman in light of the sliding fee arrangement, which
was instituted in some measure at the initiative of the nonaffiliated
directors. 88 In Saxe, on the other hand, the court may have been
hesitant to impose liability because of the inherent problem of adviser domination of the directors in the industry, and the consequent
lack of any effective internal control. Yet the court felt compelled to
lay down some guidelines on directorial responsibility. 80 As a result
of these and similar cases, it appears clear that the independent
directors have some common-law affirmative obligation to review the
adviser's compensation, to compare it ·with that received by similar
advisers, and to take action before the level of compensation reaches
the point of waste.
The Delaware court squarely considered the duties of independent
directors in Lutz v. Boas. 90 Without informing the directors, the adviser in effect delegated its authority to another adviser in violation
of the fund's charter. The two advisers and those independent directors subject to the court's jurisdiction were held jointly and
severally liable for the advisory fees paid to the principal fund manager and for the losses resulting from superfluous sales enter~d into in
reliance upon the unauthorized advice. 91 The court found the in85. 40 Del. Ch. at 496, 184 A.2d at 615.
86. There has been a trend toward higher profit ratios for larger advisory firms,
See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 10, at 230; PUBUC POLICY IMPLICATIONS,
supra note 4, at 121-25.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1970).
88. See 39 Del. Ch. at 568, 170 A.2d at 723.
89. See text accompanying note 84-86 supra. The court considered shareholder ap•
proval to be a relevant factor in finding the fee reasonable, or at least in putting a
stricter burden of proof on plaintiff, despite the pro forma nature of such votes, 40
Del. Ch. at 489, 184 A.2d at 611-12.
90. 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (1961).
91. 39 Del. Ch. at 610, 171 A.2d at 396.
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dependent directors grossly negligent in failing to discover the illegal
transactions, stating that the directors "gave scant attention" to the
fund's management and "made no efforts to be informed.'' 92
The willingness of the Delaware court to impose directorial
responsibility hinged on the extent to which the directors had relinguished their £unctions. Specifically, the court found that the
directors gave "almost automatic approval" to the management contract. 93 But a court would be more likely to find a breach of fiduciary
duty when the automatic renewal is an approval of an adviser guilty
of blatant violations of the terms of the fund's charter than when the
automatic renewal is of an approval of an adviser whose performance
is comparable to general industry levels.
In Brown v. Bullock94 a federal court dealt with a complaint under
the Investment Company Act. The plaintiff alleged excessive management fees and void advisory and underwriting contracts because of
the emasculation of the independent directors by the external adviser,
the knowing acquiescence of the independent directors in abuses by
the adviser, and an abdication by these directors of their £unctions.
The primary significance of the case lay in its sanctioning of a private
right of action under section 36 of the 1940 Investment Company
Act, a section that on its face permitted actions only by the SEC.95
The court did, however, go beyond this threshold issue and attempted
to delineate guidelines regarding the duties of independent directors.
Fiduciary duties exist under the Act for matters beyond the scope of
traditional common-law concern. Thus independent directors must
honestly and diligently exercise their best judgment solely for the
interests of the fund and its shareholders.96 They must determine
whether the renewal of an adviser's contract is desirable, and "keep
alert" for reasons that might render termination of the contract
advisable. 97 However, the court stated that ordinary negligence, mere
mismanagement, or vicarious fault were not grounds for finding
liability. 98 In affirming, the Second Circuit agreed that section 15
of the Act required not merely "formal" but "substantial"99 annual
approval of the management contract.
A court has yet to hold an independent director liable because of
an unreasonable management fee, despite convincing evidence of
favorable economies of scale which could have been partially passed
on to the fund. Several funds have switched to graduated fees pursu92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

39 Del. Ch. at 609, 171 A.2d at 396.
39 Del. Ch. at 609, 171 A.2d at 395.
194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afjd., 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
See note 41 supra.
194 F. Supp. at 238.
194 F. Supp. at 235.
194 F. Supp. at 238.
Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 {2d Cir. 1962).
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ant to settlements of shareholder suits100 or in apprehension of the
dictum in Saxe that fees can approach the point of waste and that
directors have a duty to act before that point is reached. The only
case imposing liability on independent directors, Lutz, can be characterized as involving a gross disregard of a fiduciary obligation of
due care-when the adviser engages in an egregious breach of his
duties and the directors fail to take appropriate action.
The advisory fee problem may also be attacked collaterally. If
it can be shown that the board that approved the adviser's contract
did not contain a sufficient number of independent directors, then
the contract is void under section 46 101 for failure to satisfy the approval requirements of section 15.102 Fees paid to the adviser under
the void contract would then be subject to review under general
principles of restitution. The courts, however, have tended to engage
in strained interpretations of the section 15 requirements in concluding that the directors were, in fact, "unaffiliated" or independent.
For example, in Acampora v. Birkland,1°3 the plaintiff charged that
various directors were not independent and therefore that section
IO(b), which requires a majority of the board to be independent,104 was
violated. One director did printing for the adviser and fund, another
was a broker whose firm did some of the fund's business, and a third
was vice-president and treasurer of the fund and was associated with
a firm which received give-up commissions. Before the 1970 amendments, a director was deemed independent if he was not an "affiliated
person" within section 2(a)(3).105 The court correctly interpreted
that provision as not preventing independent directors from having
economic ties with the adviser or fund. With respect to the officer100. The few cases involving advisory contracts and fees decided on the merits rep•
resent but a small portion of the shareholder suits in this area. Settlements in other
suits have resulted in graduated fee arrangements or a return in a lump sum of past
fees. See, e.g., Kerner v. Crossman, 211 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Factors which
usually lead the court to find the proposed settlement "fair" include "the difficulty
of convincing a court that the fees are so excessive as to be beyond the reasonable business judgment of the directors" (Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304, 306 (S,D.N.Y.
1970)); full disclosure of the fees made to the shareholders (49 F.R.D. at 306); shareholder ratification of the settlement (Saminsky v. Abbot, 41 Del. Ch. 320, 327, 194 A.2d
549, 552-53 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964)); and approximation of the contested fees to the industry average (Klienman v. Saminsky, 41 Del. Ch. 572,579, 200 A,2d
572, 577 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964)). Thus, as a noted fund critic has said,
"There have been times when fees have been reduced, but that's in spite of the unaffiliated directors." Conference, supra note 19, at 753 (remarks of A. Pomerantz),
101. 15 U.S.C. § S0a-46 (1970).
102. 15 U.S.C. § S0a-15- (1970).
103. 220. F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
104. 15 U.S.C. § S0a-lO(b) (1970).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) provides that an affiliated person of another person
means "any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with, such other person." Under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1970) a "natural person
shall be presumed not to be a controlled person ••••"
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director, the court held that he was not independent for purposes of
section 10.106 It went on to nullify that finding, however, by holding
that section 10 must be read separately from section 15. Even though
section 2(a)(3)(D) 107 specifically includes "any officer" as an "affiliated
person," the court held that the officer-director was unaffiliated for
purposes of section 15.108 It defies logic to suggest that Congress would
set up the independent director safeguard of section 10 and yet intend some different group of directors for section 15 contract approvals, which is one of the primary statutory functions of the
independent director. The decision may be justified on the ground
that the officer of the fund, who had a substantial interest in fund
shares, would have had the fund's best interests in mind. But it is
also true that he not only received give-up commissions from portfolio transactions that were directed to him by the adviser, but also
sold insurance to the fund,109 which was likely ordered for the fund
by the adviser. This demonstrates the impossibility of true independence if directors have economic ties to the fund or adviser.
A similar situation was involved in Coran v. Thorpe, 110 in which
five of the eight independent directors were partners or employees
in brokerage firms handling portfolio business for the fund or special technical advisers to the external management company. The
court held that proof of an economic relationship between a fund
director and its adviser, underwriter, or broker did not ipso facto
compel a conclusion that he was a controlled or affiliated director.111
The court summarized the real meaning of this case and Acampora
when it stated, "[P]laintiff is really arguing as to what the Act
should provide."112
Partially in response to the failure of the courts to mitigate excessive fees, Congress passed the 1970 amendments to the Act.113
The amendments provide that an approval of the advisory contract
by the independent directors or shareholders is to be given only such
weight as the court deems appropriate in the circumstances of the
particular case.114 Arguably, the amendments do not authorize the
court to substitute its business judgment for that of the directors, or
to ignore concepts developed by the courts regarding director au106. 220 F. Supp. at 543-44.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (1970) provides that an affiliated person of another
person means "any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other
person."
108. 220 F. Supp. at 544.
109. 220 F. Supp. at 536.
110. 42 Del. Ch. 67, 203 A.2d 620 (1964).
111. 42 Del. Ch. at 72, 203 A.2d at 623.
112. 42 Del. Ch. at 73, 203 A.2d at 623 (emphasis added).
113. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
114. 1970 Amendments, supra note 18, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 80-35(b)(2) (1970).
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thority and responsibility.115 The amendments are "not intended to
shift the responsibility for managing an investment company in the
best interest of its shareholders from the directors . . . to the judiciary. "116 Congress intended the directors to continue to have a
fiduciary duty with respect to "all of the affairs of the fund" and to
have "an important role" in the management fee area.11 7
Will the amendments assist shareholders in obtaining the best
investment advice for a fair cost? They may, but it will be despite
any role the independent director might play in reviewing the cost
of fund management and regardless of the rhetoric in the legislative
history concerning the continuing important role of the independent
director. While section 36(b) 118 now authorizes a derivative action
against the adviser and any director, officer, or underwriter regarding advisory fees, under section 36(b)(3)119 no such action can be
brought against, and no relief obtained from, any person other
than the recipient of the compensation, which in most cases will be
the adviser alone. Moreover, relief is limited to actual damages,
but no more than the compensation paid the recipient; it is also
limited to the damages suffered within one year before filing suit.120
The apparent lack of remedy against the independent director
in advisory fee cases need not undermine the substantive provisions
for director responsibilities. Since the court must give directorial
approval only such consideration as it deems appropriate in such
cases, it may now actually be to the advantage of the adviser to have
a truly independent and active board. For example, in weighing all
the relevant factors the court would undoubtedly consider such
things as the substance and genuineness of the deliberations of the
independent directors,121 the type of information the directors requested or received, and their ultimate evaluation of the contract.
The adviser may thus have a vested interest in having the independent directors engage in an impartial review of the management
contract. Finally, the independent director will still be subject to
the SEC's power to seek relief against violations of fiduciary duties
115. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1969).
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 6. To assist the directors in discharging their responsibilities, the Act
now specifically requires that the directors request, and the adviser furnish, all infor•
mation reasonably necessary to evaluate the management contract. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c)
(1970).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1970).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1970). As an additional limitation, jurisdiction for
§ 36(b) actions is now confined to the federal courts. 15 U.S.C, § 80a-35(b)(5) (1970). It
would appear that an action could still be brought in a state court based on common•
law standards of fiduciary duty. But in light of the lack of success in this area, this
will probably be an infrequently used tactic.
121. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
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not relating directly to the management fee arrangement, under
section 36(a).122
The 1970 amendments will ensure a more truly independent
board since they modified the "interested person" test.123 The independent directors will no longer be able to own stock in the advisory firm, 124 nor ·will they be able to act as legal counsel to the fund
or adviser.125 However, the strongest prohibition, that barring a
director with a material business or professional relationship with
the fund or adviser, will be effective only if the SEC formally determines that he is an interested person.126 Affiliations like those in
Acampora127 and Coran128 will undoubtedly continue unless the SEC
actively polices the underlying relationships between the adviser and
the independent directors.
In the management contract and fee area, the cases acknowledge
and the legislative history glorifies the duties and responsibilities of
the independent director. But because of the external domination of
the fund, the independent director has not proved to be an effective
control. This might have been anticipated since regulation through
independent directors was originally the result of a compromise
proposed by the investment company industry to stave off more
rigorous regulation. 129 It can be argued that the role of the independent director should be a weak one and that the duty to review management performance and fees should not be interpreted to
mean "swords-point" combat, since there was full disclosure of the
fees to the shareholders, who are free to redeem their shares if dissatisfied with fund performance.180 Moreover, if the independent
directors were to refuse to renew a contract it would leave the fund
temporarily without management and could lead to a costly proxy
battle,131 which the directors could not hope to win since the proxy
machinery is controlled by the adviser. Not only are most independent directors technically incapable of managing a large fund for
122. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970).
123. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
124. 1970 Amendments, supra note 18, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(l9)(B)(iii) (1970).
125. 1970 Amendments, supra note 18, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(l9)(A)(iv), (B)(vi)
(1970).
126. 1970 Amendments, supra note 18, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(l9)(A)(iv), (B)(vi)
(1970).
127. See text accompanying notes 103-05 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
129. See Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 269, 289-90
(1941).
130. Compare Lobell, A Critique of the Wharton School Report on Mutual Funds,
49 VA. L. R.Ev. 1, 15 (1963), with Herman, Lobell on the Wharton School Study of
Mutual Funds: A. Rebuttal, 49 VA. L. R.Ev. 938, 950 (1963).
131. PUBLIC Poucy IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 131; Lobell, The Mutual Fund:
A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. R.Ev. 181, 205 (1961).
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any length of time, but also the resulting proxy costs might be to the
detriment of the fund.
These arguments do not mean that the independent directors
should avoid active review of the management contract and fee.
Shareholders also invested in the fund in reliance on the declared
investment policy of the fund and with the expectation of fair dealing
from the adviser. Many shareholders may have purchased their shares
when the fee in relation to fund assets appeared reasonable, not
having considered the growth that might occur because of the nature
of an open-end fund. The redemption provision is always an ax over
the head of management, but it is seldom an economically sound
alternative for the shareholder.132
If the independent director requirement is to be retained, it
should be made a meaningful requirement. At a minimum the independent directors should be under an obligation to justify formally
an approval of renewal of the advisory contract to the shareholders.
The report should present an evaluation of the adviser's performance,
a comparison of its fee to that of similar funds, and the reasons for
believing that the adviser's present fee is fair, or the steps they have
taken to seek reduction of the fee, all in terms understandable to the
layman. This report could easily be included in the regular quarterly
or annual report sent to fund shareholders. The SEC could require
such a report under its rule-making power; 133 this requirement would
be consistent with the policy of full disclosure established in the
various federal security laws.134 In any case, most shareholders are
unlikely to be influenced by such disclosures if they are satisfied with
the income and capital gains earned by their shares.180 If disclosure,
however, leads to even a small increase in shareholder suits contesting
the management fee, advisers may be more willing to bargain at armslength to avoid not only litigation expense, but also the damaging
publicity of a suit, which could affect potential investors.
The independent directors should be under a duty to review
regularly the feasibility of internalizing fund management. If the
proposal has merit, it should be submitted to the shareholders. Internalization should be considered especially for the very large funds
in which a fee based upon a percentage of assets results in an unreasonable entrepreneurial reward because of the great economies of
scale. Internalization could be accomplished by terminating the
132. See text accompanying notes 26·27 supra.
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-37 to -39 (1970).
134. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, SECURITIES REGULATION 66 (2d ed. 1968),
135. The disclosure requirement in securities regulation has been criticized as
having little impact on the decisions of investors, especially for new issues. Id. at 97•98,
In effect "the buyer in these transactions gets his prospectus more as a memento than
as a vehicle of information." Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act, 48 CoLUM, L. REV,
313, 323 (1948).
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advisory contract and hiring expert investment counselors as salaried
employees of the fund. Alternatively, the fund could purchase control
of the current adviser and retain its technical personnel. Internalization should always be considered in cases when the adviser already
wishes to divorce itself from the fund. 136
A decision to internalize management is not without its difficulties. As a practical matter, the adviser's domination of the fund and
its directors would usually lead to defeat of the proposal; hence the
adviser must be willing to accept internalization if the plan is to be
implemented. Its reluctance to accept internalization is understandable. The adviser founded and developed the fund and to require internalization because, for example, the fund has reached a certain
size would be to deprive the adviser of its entrepreneurial reward.
Moreover, the shareholders of the fund could enjoy the same eco~
nomic benefits if the external adviser would simply consent to a
reduction in fees. Nevertheless, in some situations internalization
may prove to be the most viable alternative and should receive the
attention of the independent directors.
B.

The Watchdog Function

A second major responsibility for the independent director is that
of "watchdog" over the normal operations of the fund. This role includes overseeing the adherence by the investment adviser to the
investment policies of the fund; the allocation and rebate of brokerage; the direction and supervision of fund expenses and miscellaneous
operations; and the selection of certified public accountants and
attorneys £or the fund. It is here that it may be said that the director's duties are most analogous to the regular corporate director.

I. Fund Investment Policies
The investment policies in the fund's charter cannot be changed
unless authorized by the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting
securities.137 Since the adviser controls the day-to-day investment decisions,138 the directors owe a duty to the shareholders to keep the
adviser from departing from the stated objectives.139 In view of the
disparate objectives pursued by various funds, such control _is an
essential safeguard to shareholders, who invested in the fund primarily upon the basis of these declared objectives.
136. The recent case of Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 {2d Cir. 1971), provides
a notable example of a situation in which internalization might well have been considered. For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 203-07 infra.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1970).
138. Few boards of directors of mutual funds review individual portfolio trading
decisions of the adviser prior to actuation. See INsrrrunONAL INVESTORS REPORT, supra
note 10, at 167, 184.
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l(b)(6) &: -36(a) (1970).
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The classic case of breach of duty in this area is Aldred Investment
Trust v. SEG.140 The investment adviser, in an abrupt departure
from the fund's declared policy, sold thirty per cent of the fund's
portfolio of utility stocks and purchased control of a race track. The
SEC obtained injunctions against any further acts by the officers and
independent directors141 and had receivers appointed to manage the
fund. The court found a breach of fiduciary obligations in that the
directors were at all times subject to the adviser's wishes and readily
acquiesced in all his plans for management of the trust. 142
In Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 143 the court went a step
further: the independent directors were found to have a duty not only
to protect the investment policy of the fund, but also to preserve the
right of the shareholders to change the investment policy.144 The adviser formed a common-stock fund, Wellington Equity Fund, while
currently managing a balanced fund, Wellington Fund. The plaintiff,
a shareholder in the latter fund, sued to prevent the use of the name
"Wellington" by the new fund, a use which the directors of his
fund had approved. The court enjoined such use, finding it a gift of
a corporate asset and invalid absent unanimous shareholder approval.145 The decision was based upon two considerations. First,
Wellington Fund would be effectively pre-empted from changing its
investment objectives because of the interest of the adviser in retaining distinctive funds in order to attract a wide range of investors
while availing itself of the investment reputation associated with
"Wellington Fund."146 Second, the court indicated that it would not
be fair to the shareholders or to the directors to have the respective
funds exposed to potential conflicts of interest.147
The problem of fund complexes with interlocking directorates
looms large in the investment company field. 148 Numerous conflicts
may arise among such funds, particularly when they have different
investment policies. How is a high demand, limited quantity new
issue, for example, to be allocated between a balanced fund and a
p.igh-risk fund? Or what determination is to be made when both
funds wish to sell stock that the market can absorb only in small
140. 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
141. The independent directors were actually trustees because of the business form
chosen by the fund. However, the sanctions of the Act apply equally to directors or
trustees under § 26.
142. 151 F.2d at 257.
143. 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), a/fd., 3ll! F.2d 4'12, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806
(1963).
144. 187 F. Supp. at 208.
145. 187 F. Supp. at 2ll-12.
146. See 187 F. Supp. at 207-09.
147. See 187 F. Supp. at 210.
148. See Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 205 (1970).
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quantities? It has been suggested that the independent director of
a fund within a complex should determine whether the fund is in
danger of receiving prejudicial treatment from the adviser of the
complex by comparing the benefits the adviser stands to receive from
each fund within the complex.149 Although theoretically sound, such
a review would be largely ineffectual if the independent director
serves several funds within the complex.
The court in Taussig recognized that if a duty to either fund is
breached, a suitable remedy is available. Yet it was not willing to
find, as a matter of law, a conflict of interest when the adviser and
independent directors serve more than one fund. 150 The 1970 amendments do not appear to have directly addressed this problem. An independent director serving more than one fund in the complex may
be deemed to be an "interested person" only if he has a material business or professional relationship with the other fund, and then only
upon order of the SEC.151 Yet arguably a directorate itself should
be considered a material relationship. It is unlikely that an independent director could serve two or more related funds without
conflicts arising152 and it is unfair to the shareholders of either fund
to permit the directors to balance the competing interests of shareholders.
Not only must the independent director assure that the adviser
adheres to the fund's investment policy, but he must also assure that
the adviser pursues it in such a manner as to achieve the optimal performance consistent with the investment objectives. The nature of
the shareholders' investment demands close scrutiny by the directors
to protect the investors' profit expectations. The fund shareholder is
likely to be a small, unknowledgeable investor relying on the adviser
to supply the investment skill that he lacks. While the adviser's performance is to be considered when its contract is being renewed, this
review cannot displace current review throughout the contract period. If review is undertaken only at the time of renewal, poor performance may have already become history, and the shareholders'
investment may have been damaged.

2. Regular Portfolio Transactions
In the regular portfolio transactions of a mutual fund, the watchdog role of the independent director is one of ensuring best execution,153 as well as preventing certain specific abuses involving com149. Id. at 277-82.
150. 187 F. Supp. at 216.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(l9)(A)(vi) (1970).
152. 187 F. Supp. at 210.

153. Best execution is the payment of the lowest possible commission on portfolio
transactions, while receiving the highest price on sales and lowest price on purchases
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mission give-ups, reciprocals, recapture, and portfolio churning. If
best execution on a trade is not obtained, the fund does not receive
the full asset value of the stock, and hence there is a diminution of
fund assets. However, because of the many intricacies involved in
obtaining best execution,154 any liability of the independent directors should be limited to a failure to use common business judgment,
or to a failure to review the adviser's brokerage allocations.
A recent case, Moses v. Burgin, 165 concerned numerous issues including that of best execution.156 The district court found that best
execution had been obtained.157 In so concluding the district court
noted with approval that the independent directors had received and
evaluated oral and written reports from the adviser concerning the
placement of brokerage, and had determined that the adviser's policy
of allocating brokerage as a reward for selling fund shares and providing investment advice was to be followed only if best execution could
be obtained from such broker.lli 8 It is open to question whether best
execution really is the paramount consideration when brokerage is
allocated to a broker who is also a substantial seller of the fund's
shares. 159 These rewards encourage increased sales efforts by the
broker, which increase the fund's net assets and the adviser's com•
pensation. This indirect benefit to the adviser should be a factor to
be considered both by the courts and the independent directors in
determining the fairness of the advisory fee, once it is determined
that best execution has been obtained.
Closely related to the question of best execution is the practice
consistent with the volume, the exchange used, market conditions, and the nature of
the security. It is generally a factor only in large block transactions since most brokers
can handle trades involving a few thousand shares or less equally well. See generally
Note, Conflict of Interest in the Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage BtlSiness, SO
YALE L.J. 372, 375-77 (1970).
154. In addition to obtaining the best price, the broker must keep the fund's
intention secret and prevent adverse effects on the market for the particular security.
Moreover, transactions in the third or fourth market should be considered. The third
market consists of trades in New York Stock Exchange listed securities through non•
member brokers. The fourth market consists of direct sales between funds and other
institutional investors.
155. 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), Tevd., 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 994 (1971).
156. Other issues in the case are discussed in text accompanying notes 166-78 infra,
157. 316 F. Supp. at 39. The finding on this issue was not appealed.
158. 316 F. Supp. at 37-39.
159. In a recent public statement, William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC, an•
nounced that the SEC will request the National Association of Security Dealers to
establish rules terminating the practice of placing portfolio executions with brokers
in consideration of their sales of fund shares. If the Association fails to act, the Com•
mission will consider rule-making to accomplish this result. W. Casey, statement upon
release of the SEC Policy Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets,
Feb. 2, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP., Special Report No. 409, at 39-43 {Feb. 4, 1972)
[hereinafter Casey Statement].

:March 1972]

Comments

717

of adviser-directed reciprocity. Reciprocity is an indirect form of a
give-up160 in which the executing broker, upon direction of the fund
manager, rewards another broker with unrelated business on another
stock exchange. Questions of liability only arise if best execution has
not been obtained as a result of this practice. In Moses the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit found no reason to reject the SEC's conclusion that awarding reciprocals even to brokers who have done
nothing to benefit the fund is unobjectionable if it "does not in any
way operate as a detriment to the funds and if the funds have themselves derived as much as they can from these benefits."161 However,
since reciprocals are frequently of benefit to the adviser, they should
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the advisory fee.
Before adviser-directed give-ups were abolished on all stock exchanges,162 recapture of commissions on portfolio transactions could
be accomplished by channeling give-ups through a broker affiliate
who was a member of some stock exchange or through the fund's
undenvriter if the undenvriter was a member of the National Association of Security Dealers.168 Now that such give-ups are forbidden,
recapture for the benefit of the fund is limited to brokerage commissions that are directly refunded. This can be accomplished by the fund
through affiliation with a broker on regional exchanges that permit
broker-fund affiliation.164 Because of the nature of the industry, however, it is more likely that the adviser, not the fund, would have a
broker affiliate. Recapture for the fund would then be accomplished
by applying the recaptured portion of the brokerage commissions to
the advisory fee.
The duty of the independent director with regard to recapture of
commissions on portfolio transactions is largely an open question.165
Perhaps the leading case that has dealt with the problem is Moses,
160. Give-ups involve the relinquishment of the broker, upon order of the fund
adviser, of some portion of the sales commission for portfolio transactions to another
broker who took no part in the transaction. Give-ups are used to reward brokers for
selling fund shares or for furnishing statistical data and advice. The issue of give-ups
is largely moot since they were banned by the New York Stock Exchange in 1968.
NYSE Constitution, art. XV, § I, CCH NYSE GumE 11 701 (1976). See Moses v. Burgin,
445 F.2d 369, 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
161. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994
(1971).
162. See note 160 supra.
163. See Miller 8: Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds,
46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 35, 55-59 (1971).
164. The SEC has announced that it will request exchange action to exclude from
membership those brokerage firms whose primary function is to route ponfolio
execution orders in order to recapture brokerage commissions. The SEC is also ta consult
with the exchanges concerning explusion from membership of firms whose business
is not predominantly with the public, which would include many brokers affiliated
with funds and their advisers. Affiliation with a broker doing substantial business with
the general public would be allowed. Casey Statement, supra note 159, at 44-56.
165. See Miller 8: Carlson, supra note 163, at 55-59.
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in which the adviser and affiliated directors were found to have engaged in gross misconduct by failing to inform the independent directors of the possibility of recapturing give-ups.166 The court acknowledged that independent directors have a duty to consider such
matters on their ovm, but found no violation of their duty to discover
and explore issues important to the fund in this instance because
recapture was a new problem and they were entitled to rely upon information and advice of the management defendants who devoted
full time to the investment industry.167 The court noted that the independent directors were "legally unaffiliated and factually independent,"168 and without a "personal conflicting interest."169 This
suggests that the court might have found a breach of duty for not
having discovered and explored such an important issue if the directors were more closely tied to the adviser or affiliated with a brokerage house doing business with the adviser. The court also noted that
the attention of the independent directors had not been drawn to a
recent study dealing with recapture through an undenvriter affiliate.170 While it is debatable whether a mutual fund director should
have the duty to read an important document affecting its function,
Moses suggests that if actual knowledge could be shown, responsibility might attach. 171
The court specifically held that it was the responsibility of the
directors, not the management, to determine whether recapture was
practicable.172 If the directors decided in the affirmative, they could
not choose between directly recapturing the give-ups for the fund's
benefit and awarding them to brokers for its indirect benefit, but
were obligated to seek recapture for the fund. 173 However, if the adviser is not affiliated with an undenvriter, the independent directors
are not required to establish a broker affiliate for recapture if that
would not be in the best interests of the fund. 174 Although the directors in Moses had not been informed of the possibility of using an
undenvriter affiliate of the adviser, they had been informed of the
possibility of recapture through a broker-affiliate. The directors rejected the latter course on the ground that any benefits which the
fund might derive through credits against the management and receipt of give-ups might be ounveighed by poorer executions. The
166. 445 F.2d at 383.
167. 445 F.2d at 384.
168. 445 F.2d at 371 n.l.
169. 445 F.2d at 384.
170. 445 F.2d at 378-79, referring to
171. See 445 F.2d at 379.
172. 445 F.2d at 383.
173. 445 F.2d at 374.
174. 445 F.2d at 374-75.
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supra note 4.
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court found this to be a sound business reason for the decision.1 w
The result is basically in accord with the view of the SEC, although
the SEC contends that such recapture may be demanded if there is
existing affiliation with a broker and the exchange rules permit it.176
The decision in Moses clearly indicates that if the independent
directors are aware of the possibility of recapturing some or all of a
broker-affiliate's profits from transacting fund business, at a minimum they have a duty to explore the feasibility of such recapture.
Although an affiliate is permitted to retain profits out of transactions
it handles for the fund under section 17(e) of the Act,177 the court
maintained that the independent directors have a duty to negotiate
with the adviser for a credit of these funds toward the advisory fee. 178
But given the limited power of these directors in the management
fee area, and the general reluctance to impose liability on the directors, the problem of affiliated-broker profits might be more successfully attacked on the ground of fairness of the management fee in
determining whether the adviser has breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b) by accepting and charging excessive compensation.
This appears to be the approach followed by shareholder suits
settled before the effective date of the 1970 amendments. In Kurach
v. Weissman, 179 an excessive fee case, the court approved a settlement
calling for future offsets against the management fee of the profits
earned by an affiliated broker on execution of fund transactions on
a regional exchange, with a minimum offset of at least one million
dollars over five years.180 The arrangement is to continue indefinitely
unless the stockholders vote to discontinue it. Similarly, in a recent
proposed settlement of an excessive-fee case, the adviser agreed to
form an affiliated broker, seek to have the broker admitted to two
regional exchanges, and credit the recaptured brokerage fees against
advisory fees over a period of ten years, with a minimum rebate of
I½ million dollars.1s1
A related issue is whether the profits of an adviser-affiliated broker
from reciprocal business should also be credited against management
fees. Here the independent directors would clearly appear to have
neglected their duty to the shareholders if the credit was not demanded. As previously noted, section 17(e) of the Act permits reten175. 445 F.2d at 375.
176. SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8746 (1969). But cf. note 164 supra.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970).
178. 445 F.2d at 374.
179. 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
180. 49 F.R.D. at 305.
181. See Wall St. J., June 7, 1971, at 5, col. I. The use of affiliated brokers in this
manner is limited to certain regional exchanges, the Philadelphia-Washington-Baltimore Exchange and the Pacific Coast Exchange, because of the anti-rebate rules of
other exchanges.
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tion of profits upon the execution of fund transactions by an affiliate.
Reciprocity profits, however, do not result from the execution of a
fund transaction, but rather they come as a windfall to the affiliate
because the fund has executed a transaction on another exchange.
Thus this profit is derived because of the mere existence of the fund,
and therefore it should accrue to the benefit of the fund shareholders.
This is the position taken by the SEC.182
A final prQblem warranting director attention is that of portfolio
churning.183 A study has found that the average turnover rate of
mutual fund portfolios is 56.7%, as compared with insurance company portfolio turnover of 20.6% and individual and personal trust
account turnover of 20.2%. 184 When the turnover rate becomes excessive, serious problems arise. Asset value may decline not only because best execution could not be attained, but also because of the
unnecessary commissions that are generated. The independent director should carefully compare the adviser's performance with the
fund's investment policy for evidence of churning. The directors
must also guard against a more subtle ruse-effectuating portfolio
sales in order to generate excessive capital gains, thereby increasing
the marketability of the fund's shares.186
3.

General Fund Operation

A minor role of the independent directors is that of over-all control of the fund's operations and miscellaneous expenses. 186 Because
his duty here is the same as that of any other corporate director, the
182. The SEC has adopted the position that under § l'l(e), only compensation for
actual brokerage services rendered may be retained by the adviser or affiliated broker.
SEC, Securities E.'Cchange Act Release No. 8746 (Nov. 10, 1969). See Miller &: Carlson,
supra note 163, at 47-49.
183. Portfolio churning involves excessive purchases and sales of securities, often
with little regard for fund objectives, in order to generate brokerage commissions or
to reward brokers for selling fund shares. See INsrrrunoNAL INVESTORS REPORT, supra
note 10, at 170.
184. Id. at 189.
185. Since capital gains are basically passed through to the shareholders from a
qualifying mutual fund, INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-52, many investors are attracted
by the more favorable capital gains tax rates, INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-02. If
the fund's capital gain position attracts new investors, tl1e adviser profits through an
increased fund asset base upon which his fee is based, and by the sales load he re•
ceives for new investments. In addition, if the adviser is affiliated with a broker, he may
have been able to recapture in part the commissions on the portfolio transactions
generating the capital gains. Moreover, many shareholders automatically reinvest their
capital gains, thus preventing any drain on the fund's assets and a consequential re•
duction in the adviser's fee. Such considerations might lead an unethical adviser to sell
securities before they have reached their full gain potential. This is a danger even in
those funds with a specific statutory investment objective of generating capital gains,
186. These expenses include transfer fees, custodian fees, taxes, interest, insurance,
filing fees, legal and auditing, shareholder reports, stationary, directors' fees, registration
fees, and administrative and safekeeping expenses. See generally INsrITUTIONAL INVESTORS
REPORT, supra note 10, at 207-08.
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independent director should be held to the normal standard-waste
of corporate assets. In many mutual funds, all such expenses are covered by the adviser's fee. Thus, only directors of those funds that
provide their own services or have separate expense contracts with
external management will have a duty here. When the management
contract covers some or all such expenses, the directors are obligated
to scrutinize the acts of the adviser with care according to Acampora.187 The court there held that the standard of care for interpreting the expense contract and insisting upon the adviser's assuming
the expenses allocable to it is gross negligence, or at least bad
faith. 188 The court found that the independent directors' conduct
evidenced merely a lack of prudence; the fund was entitled to restitution from the adviser for the misallocated expenses only.
Another minor, but nonetheless important duty of the independent director is the appointment and approval of the fund's attorneys
and certified public accountants. Because most independent directors
are not investment or mutual fund experts they rely upon the reports
and advice of others, frequently the adviser. 189 Often the adviser and
fund retain the same lawyers and accountants, which deprives the
directors of fully independent counsel and creates opportunities for
conflicts of interest. 190 While there are cost advantages to sharing
attorneys and accountants, the added expense would appear to be
justified in the interest of better protection of the shareholders. Independent accounting and legal counsel can serve to remind the
individual directors of their obligations, assist in evaluating and
negotiating the management contract, and provide a base for the
better exercise of business judgment in general.
Under section 31 of the Act,191 which requires approval of the
accountants by a majority of the independent directors, the directors
clearly have the power to appoint separate certified public accountants. On the other hand, the Act gives the directors no power to
control the appointment of legal counsel. Clearly the Act should be
amended to remove this inconsistency, as well as to require the fund's
accountants and lawyers to be distinct from those of the adviser.

4. Suggestions
The watchdog function can be summarized as the duty of the independent directors to prevent damage to the fund by maintaining
187. 220 F. Supp. at 550.
188. 220 F. Supp. at 550.
189. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 130.
190. Id. at 74, 130. "[T]he unaffiliated directors necessarily obtain most of their
information about fund operations from persons who owe allegiance to, and obtain the
preponderance of their compensation from the adviser-underwriters and who cannot
be expected to look at such matters as advisory fees in a disinterested way." Id. at 131.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31 (1970).
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close current review of the adviser's activities. It may be suggested
that this duty should be a minimal one. Perhaps the strongest argument for an insignificant role is that the shareholders invested in the
fund in reliance upon the reputation of the adviser, and to interfere
with the adviser's broad discretion in areas other than fraud frustrates the expectation of these shareholders.102 The reluctance of the
courts to scrutinize the activities of independent directors indicates
that the judiciary may have implicitly accepted this argument.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the role of the independent director should be strengthened so that it can be an effective
prophylactic force. The case for holding the independent directors
to a higher standard of :fiduciary duty can be justified by the failure
of the independent director to fulfill the role envisioned by Congress,
the lack of effective shareholder control, the limited enforcement
capabilities of the SEC, and the inherent potential for abuse within
the industry. The mutual funds are entrusted with savings of millions of small, unsophisticated investors and in the aggregate these
funds are sufficient to permit a significant impact on the investment
market. 193 Finally, it may be that a more significant role might lead
to the selection of personnel with the time and expertise that should
characterize the industry.
To what standard then should these directors be held? The most
extreme position would be to make independent directors strict
trustees, with a standard as high or higher than that of the adviser
inasmuch as the adviser is chosen and approved, at least theoretically, by the independent directors. This position is unrealistic, and
has been explicitly rejected by the courts.194 It ignores the basic
structure of the industry-the adviser created the fund, makes the
investment decisions, and reaps the rewards. It ignores the difficulty
of finding directors not only qualified but also willing to assume
such an obligation. The fund would have to engage a separate staff
to assist the directors, which would result in increased expenses. The
independent directors would then need veto power over the adviser
in addition to their power to terminate the contract. This would lead
to suits challenging the decisions of the directors in opposition to
the adviser, and the courts would be forced to decide which group
properly exercised its function.
A better basis for the higher standard, it has been suggested,
would be to hold the independent directors to the same standards
as bank or insurance company directors; that is, a higher standard
192. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 131. See also Jaretzki, Duties and
Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB, 777, 786,87
(1964); Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258,
1262 (1961); Lobell, supra note 130, at 43.
193. See generally INSTITUTIONAL !NvFSTORS REPORT, supra note 10, vol. 6, at 78•122,
194. Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 918 (8th Cir. 1961).
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than that expected of directors of nonfinancial corporations.195 Directors of financial institutions that obtain and manage the money of
others, especially that of the general public, are held to a higher
standard of fiduciary care and their conduct is subjected to closer
scrutiny by the courts.196 The higher standard is imposed because
of the liquid nature of such enterprises, the relative unsophistication
of the depositor, and the purpose of the depositor in accumulating
capital-usually for emergencies or retirement.197 The courts expect
the reasonably prudent director to exercise more care in the direction
of such an institution.198
These same factors are present in a mutual fund. In a pre-Investment Company Act case, the Virginia supreme court held the fund
directors to at least the same duty of care as bank directors.199'• The
Act clearly does not preclude the courts from holding fund directors
to a high standard of care in their watchdog function. The courts
must not accept purely nominal board action nor must they countenance negligence on the part of the directors in failing to detect
abuses by the adviser. On the other hand, the standard of care e:x.pected should not be as high as the duty imposed upon the external
adviser because the latter is the entity in full control.
The recurring impediment to an effective requirement of an
independent directorate is the dearth of qualified volunteers. This
problem will become more acute if interlocking directorates are to
be eliminated from fund complexes. A theoretical solution would be
to replace one or all independent directors with a "public interest"
director, who would be technically competent and free of any ties to
the adviser or its affiliates. His duties would be those of a true
"watchdog," obligated to advise the board and shareholders of his
recommendations for contract renewal, the fairness of the fee, and
questionable practices that he might detect. This information would
provide a reasonable basis upon which the directors could act. If he
detects violations of the Act, and the directors fail to take action, the
public interest director could file a complaint with the SEC for possible administrative action. The special director's findings should
not be conclusive, but, if he is an expert, they should be given great
weight by the court or the SEC.
Even if a sufficient number of these special directors could be
found, this proposal runs contrary to the traditional form of business
195. See Eisenberg &: Lehr, supra note 44, at 188-92.
196. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 941, 983-86 (1969).
197. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1068 (perm. ed. 1968).
198. See, e.g., Allied Freightways v. Chalfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
199. O'Connor v. First Natl. Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 926-27, 177 S.E. 852, 860
(1935).
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organization and practice. Indeed, there is some question how effective a special director would be in light of the inconclusive results
thus far achieved by special interest directors in other industries.200
But it does demonstrate the extreme measures that would be needed
to protect the shareholder and assure that he is obtaining good service for his investment at a reasonable fee. It would be possible for
the independent directors of very large funds to achieve a similar
result by hiring a specialist to assist them in evaluating the performance of the outside management. Retention of such a specialist is
not forbidden by the Act and is within the power of the directors in
the exercise of their fiduciary duty to exercise due care.
Even if aided by an expert or shareholder interest director, the
independent directors should be more qualified to fulfill their responsibilities and their qualifications should be made known to the
fund shareholder at elections. In addition, a higher standard of independence than that provided by the 1970 amendments should be
required. Those with business or professional connections with the
fund or adviser should be challengeable by less extreme measures than
an SEC action. Different funds within a complex should be required
to have different independent directors. Or, if interlocking directorates are retained, to discourage unfavorable or prejudicial treatment, directors should not be allowed to hold unequal stockholdings
in different funds.
It would also be beneficial to amend the Act to require that the
independent directors nominate their own successors.201 This practice may forestall the election of directors who, though technically
unaffiliated with the adviser, are selected because they are adherents
to the adviser's point of view. Although this would not eliminate
the adviser's influence, such a procedure would at least provide a
buffer between the adviser and new director. Even without legislation many advisers would likely acquiesce in the practice if the courts
indicated that the decisions of a more independent board would be
given greater weight in deciding the fairness of the management fee
and the potential liability of the adviser.
C.

The Role of the Independent Director
in the Sale of the Advisory Office

Under traditional common-law principles a fiduciary office could
not be sold or transferred for personal gain. 202 In a decision that
200. See Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MlcH. L. R.Ev. 419, 462-82 (1971).
201. This is apparently being encouraged by some advisers. See Glazer, supra note
44, at 234-35.
202. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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could have considerable impact on the mutual fund industry, the
Second Circuit, in Rosenfeld v. Black,203 held that it was a breach
of the adviser's fiduciary duty to transfer its business (through a
merger) to another fund management firm for an amount in excess
of book value. The court stated that any premium paid "represents
consideration ... primarily for the use of influence in securing shareholder approval of the successor,''204 and hence trafficking in a trust.
The premium represents the buyer's expectation that the management contract will be renewed and that profits will continue to be
received.
The court in Rosenfeld refused to accept the argument that it was
solely within the adviser's discretion to decide whether to retire its
position in favor of another adviser. Rather, the court referred to
the independent directors' having an affirmative responsibility to
seek out a successor, if they agreed with the managing company that
its continuance as adviser was not in the best interest of the fund. 205
The court also stated that a fiduciary endeavoring to influence the
selection of a successor must do so with an eye only to the best interests of the beneficiaries-the shareholders of the fund.206 In Rosenfeld, the adviser had informed the shareholders that the directors
had recommended approval of the merger, and the adviser did in fact
have the advance knowledge and approval of the directors in approaching the purchaser.207 Clearly the directors did not exercise any
independent function in seeking a new adviser, since there was no
evidence that the directors did anything other than to approve routinely the adviser's choice. However, liability of the directors was not
at issue, since the court was faced with a summary judgment for the
defendant adviser.
In Krieger v. Anderson,208 a case in which the issue of the duty
of the independent directors was squarely presented, the court expressed a different opinion. It held that the independent directors
had not breached their fiduciary duty by working for shareholder
approval of reinstatement of a management contract following sale
of a controlling interest in the management company. As in Rosenfeld, the sale was conditioned upon shareholder approval of a management contract with the new adviser. 209 The court held that the
203. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). The case has recently been settled for one million
dollars. Rosenfeld v. Black, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 93,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). A similar
suit involving the Dreyfus Fund has been settled for five million dollars. Newman v.
Stein, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 93,316 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
204. 445 F.2d at 1344.
205. 445 F.2d at 1347 n.14.
206. 445 F.2d at 1343.
207. 445 F.2d at 1340.
208. 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (1962).
209. 40 Del. Ch. at 367, 182 A.2d at 909.
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premium paid for the adviser's stock was not an asset of the fund, and
that it would be unfair to deprive the owners of an advisory contract
of its full value.210 The court accepted plaintiff's allegation that the
independent directors were in fact controlled by the outgoing adviser
and thus that the fund was conceivably deprived of an opportunity
to invite competing advisers to bid for the management contract.
But the court felt that it was a question of business judgment whether
to solicit bids or to deal with a single purchaser. If the directors
were shmm to have been dominated by the adviser, their decision
called for close scrutiny concerning the fairness of the transaction. 211
The court found nothing wrong with the transaction since it preserved the advisory personnel of the outgoing adviser, which had
been successful, even though the purchaser obtained greater than a
seventy per cent interest in the advisory company.
The court in Krieger relied upon an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc.212 Although recognizing the
principle that a :fiduciary may not sell or transfer his office for personal gain, the Insurance Securities court held that this principle was
not applicable. 213 It viewed the :fiduciary relationship as arising from
the advisory contract and since, by statute, such a contract automatically terminates ·with a shift in control,214 the price received
could not be said to represent compensation for the sale of a :fiduciary
office involving the fund. 215 The court also rejected the concept that
the premium paid represented the capitalized value of the advisory
contract and therefore an asset of the fund, even though it did agree
that the portion paid above book value was based upon the expectation that the advisory contract would be renewed.216
If the Rosenfeld theory were followed, changes in advisory firms
would necessarily be few. It is only when the adviser is so determined
to sell its office that it is willing to forgo economic gain on the transfer that the directors must play an active role in selecting a successor.
If the incumbent adviser did not unduly influence the shareholders
and directors, if the independent directors had a significant role to
play in choosing the new adviser, and if the price paid for the controlling interest was not greatly in excess of asset value, or if the
portion clearly representing a premium went to the fund, the sale
might be upheld. To hold otherwise "might well be unfair insofar as
it denies to the retiring management any compensation for the ele210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

40 Del. Ch. at 365, 182 A.2d at 908.
40 Del. Ch. at 367, 182 A.2d at 909.
254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
254 F.2d at 650.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
254 F .2d at 650.
254 F.2d at 650-51.

March 1972]

Comments

727

ments of value in the relationship [with the fund] which they may
have built up over the years."217 Under Insurance Securities, the sale
of the advisory office is given a presumption of validity, and thus the
role of the independent director is virtually emasculated. Yet Insurance Securities is based upon fantasy in ignoring the fact that the real
value in an advisory company's stock is the profits to be derived from
its contracts with the mutual funds. 218
Whichever theory is adopted, the independent directors should
have a strict duty to protect the interests of the fund shareholders in
this area. They should determine whether the transfer is fair to the
fund's shareholders, review the competency and reputation of the
prospective adviser, and solicit and evaluate competing offers. Because of the importance of this transaction the sale should perhaps
be conditioned upon unanimous approval by the independent directors and approval by a high percentage of the shareholders. Imposition of this responsibility would require an amendment to the Investment Company Act.
Unless Rosenfeld or a similar case is accepted by the Supreme
Court, Congress must resolve the conflict between the circuits. Rosenfeld is based on classic fiduciary principles and provides the utmost
protection to the fund shareholders, but is unfair to the transferring
adviser because it deprives him of all entrepreneurial reward. One
solution would be to obviate the role of the independent directors
by requiring that the terms of any transfer of fiduciary office be subject to advance review by the SEC. Alternatively, the Act could provide detailed requirements for such transfers, or provide for profit
splitting between the selling adviser and the fund.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In finding the independent directors liable in Lutz, the court said:
"These men are prime examples of what can happen when a man
undertakes a substantial responsibility with public overtones without
any appreciation of his obligations thereunder."219 It can also be said
that the independent director requirement is a prime example of
what can happen when Congress undertakes to legislate shareholder
safeguards without an appreciation of the nature of the industry.
The reluctance of the courts to require strong independent directors
cannot be faulted since it is based on a recognition of the directors'
lack of effective power under the Investment Company Act and the
nature of the mutual fund industry itself. To its credit, Congress
finally did recognize the ineffectiveness of independent directors in
217. PUBLIC POLICY !MFLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 152.
218. Id. at 149.
219. 39 Del. Ch. 585, 608-09, 171 A.2d 381, 395 (1961).
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the broadest area of concern-management fees. It codified the dicta
of the courts that at some point fees could become so excessive that
even the independent directors could be liable for breach of their
fiduciary duties. 220
The independent directors with their "watchdog" functions remain in the amended Act. Congress has reiterated that they are still
responsible for the over-all operations of the fund. If the independent director requirement is to be retained, some stronger standard
calling for an affirmative and aggressive overseeing of fund operations should be required.
The role of the independent director on a transfer of the advisory
function appears to be largely negative-not to campaign actively
for and influence shareholder approval of the new adviser. Shareholder protection demands an affirmative obligation to play an active
if not predominant part in selecting the new adviser.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).

